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“Damned by faint praise” is the phenomenon whereby weak positive informa-
tion leads to a negative change in belief. This seemingly conflicts with norma-
tive Bayesian predictions, which prescribe that positive information should
only exert a positive change in belief. We argue that the negative belief change
is due to an inference from critical missing evidence; that is, an implicit argu-
ment from ignorance. Such an inference is readily incorporated within a ver-
sion of Bayes’ theorem incorporating the concept of epistemic closure. This
reformalisation provides a general theoretical framework for the phenomenon
that clearly outlines those conditions under which it should be observed, and
its conceptual relationship with other argumentation phenomena.
Keywords: Belief revision; Bayesian probability; Argumentation; Persuasion;
Testimony; Pragmatics.
“James is a polite and punctual pupil.” This sentence clearly identifies posi-
tive aspects of James’ character. Were this, however, the only information
you were given about James within the context of a reference letter, it seems
likely that your impression of him might be lowered. In colloquial English,
one might say that James was “damned by faint praise”.
The “Boomerang effect”, by which a very weak positive argument can
actually lead to a negative change in belief, is already well documented
within social psychology (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). This effect is
assumed to occur through the recipient’s internal generation of stronger
counter-arguments. We, however, are specifically concerned with the effect
Address correspondence to: Adam J. L. Harris, Department of Cognitive, Perceptual and
Brain Sciences, University College London, 26, Bedford Way, London, WC1H 0AP, UK.
E-mail: adam.harris@ucl.ac.uk
Ulrike Hahn is now at Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University
of London. We thank Harriet Over for comments. A preliminary report of these results was
published in the proceedings of COGSCI09.
 2013 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The
moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
Thinking & Reasoning, 2014
Vol. 19, No. 3, 414–429, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2013.801367
of weak arguments that clearly exclude important information relating to
the issue in question. Following the familiar colloquial expression “damned
by faint praise”, we shall refer to negative belief change following the receipt
of positive evidence in these cases as the Faint Praise effect. In the Boomer-
ang effect the argument recipient has access to specific knowledge of
counter-arguments. In the Faint Praise effect there is no specific knowledge
of counter-arguments, although there may be a suspicion that the argument
proponent is not providing all the evidence at their disposal. Kervyn,
Bergsieker, and Fiske (2012; see also Madera, Hebl, &Martin, 2009) demon-
strated the “innuendo effect”, whereby a target individual described as warm
(“very nice, sociable, and outgoing person”; p. 79) was rated as less compe-
tent than a target described generally (“a very positive overall impression”;
p. 79), with the converse also being true when the target was described as
competent. One way in which positive information about a particular char-
acter trait can have a negative influence is if that trait is perceived as being
negatively correlated with other desirable traits (as with warmth and compe-
tence). In the current paper we demonstrate how a Faint Praise effect can
arise rationally without the need for such a perception.
The Faint Praise and Boomerang effects differ when measured against
Bayes’ theorem as the normative standard for belief revision. The negative
change in belief in the case of the Boomerang effect is unremarkable in that
the proponent-supplied, weak positive argument is outweighed by recipient-
supplied stronger negative considerations. This is unproblematic because
degrees of belief should be updated with respect to all the arguments/evi-
dence considered, whether provided by the argument proponent, or gener-
ated by the argument recipient themselves. By contrast, there is no explicit
negative evidence in the case of the Faint Praise effect, so that the observed
belief change appears to conflict with the prescription of Bayesian belief revi-
sion that positive evidence should lead to positive change—or, at best, have
no real effect (Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983; Lopes, 1985). Here, however, we
present and test a Bayesian formalisation from which the Faint Praise effect
follows as a normatively correct inference.
FORMALISING THE FAINT PRAISE EFFECT
To facilitate the description of our formalisation we use an example that will
recur throughout this paper. The example is of a reference letter written in
order to support James’ application to read mathematics at university.
According to Bayes’ theorem, people should update their beliefs in a
hypothesis on receipt of new information as follows:
PðhjeÞ ¼ PðhÞPðejhÞ
PðhÞPðejhÞ þ Pð:hÞPðej:hÞ ðEq:1Þ
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P(h) is an individual’s prior degree of belief in the truth of the hypothesis
under scrutiny (e.g., James is good at maths) and P(ejh) is the likelihood
term, which captures the sensitivity of the test (its “hit rate” in signal detec-
tion terms). This conditional probability is the individual’s subjective belief in
the probability that the evidence provided would be found given that the
hypothesis were true: In the current example this might refer to the likelihood
of the referee writing “James is good at maths” if James is good at maths.
P(¬h) (the probability of “not h”) corresponds to an individual’s prior degree
of belief in the falsity of the hypothesis (e.g., James is not good at maths) and
thus equals 1 – P(h). P(ej¬h) is the “false positive rate” of the evidence. This
is the individual’s belief in the probability of the positive evidence being pro-
vided given that the hypothesis is, in fact, false (e.g., the likelihood of the ref-
eree writing “James is good at maths”, if he were not). The denominator of
the equation represents the base rate of the evidence item (regardless of the
truth or falsity of the hypothesis). P(hje) is the individual’s posterior degree of
belief in the hypothesis given this new piece of evidence. Assuming P(ejh)  P
(ej¬h) (that is, assuming the evidence is not thought to be misleading), evi-
dence in favour of the hypothesis, no matter how weak, can never decrease
the person’s degree of belief in the hypothesis. Bayes’ theorem thus stipulates
that positive evidence should only have a positive impact on belief change.
Yet the Faint Praise effect is seemingly a demonstration of the opposite:
weak positive evidence resulting in a negative change in belief.
Consideration of a well-known type of informal argument, the so-called
“argument from ignorance”, however, shows how the Faint Praise effect is
actually amenable to a Bayesian formalisation. Arguments from ignorance
are arguments based on the absence of evidence, such as: “Ghosts exist
because nobody has proved that they don’t.” Examples like this originally led
to the view that arguments from ignorance were fallacious (e.g., Copi &
Cohen, 1990; Evans & Palmer, 1983; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).
Oaksford and Hahn (2004), however, noted that not all arguments from igno-
rance seem equally weak (see also Walton, 1992). There are examples of this
argument form that seem far more plausible. For example: “The train will
not stop in Oxford, because an Oxford stop is not listed in the timetable.”
One factor that influences the strength of arguments from ignorance is
epistemic closure (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Walton, 1992). The concept of
epistemic closure is best illustrated through an example: Upon consulting a
railway timetable to determine whether the 12:45 Cardiff to London train
stops at Oxford, one assumes that the timetable provides a complete list of
all the stations, and only those stations, at which the train will stop—in
other words, the timetable is a database that is epistemically closed. Conse-
quently, if Oxford is not included on the timetable then one can confidently
conclude that the train will not stop at Oxford and hence the argument
above seems entirely reasonable.
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How, then, does epistemic closure explain the “damned by faint praise”
phenomenon? We propose that the negative change in belief brought about
by a weak positive argument results from an implicit argument from igno-
rance. If James’ maths teacher writes a reference to support James’ application
for a university mathematics course that reads “James is a polite and punctual
pupil”, then he is flouting the conversational maxim of quantity: “Make your
contribution as informative as is required” (Grice, 1975/2001, p. 171).
Through a recognition that James’ maths teacher would surely know more
about James than these two facts (specifically, his maths ability) and presum-
ably be motivated to include this information were it positive, the reader can
imply that the referee must “be wishing to impart information that he is reluc-
tant to write down” (Grice, 1975/2001, p. 171). Thus the possible impact of
such evidence is best understood as an example of an argument from igno-
rance—that is, the effect of not saying “James is good at maths”.
Hahn and Oaksford (2007) presented a general, Bayesian formalisation of
the argument from ignorance that included the concept of epistemic closure.
In addition to e and ¬e, a third possibility, represented by the term n, is
included in this formalisation. Here, n (“nothing”) refers to a lack of evidence
(i.e., not explicitly reporting either “e” or “not e”), whilst ¬e refers to explicit
negative evidence (saying “not e”, for example, “James is not good at
maths”). Such an approach is familiar from Artificial Intelligence where one
might distinguish three possibilities in a database search regarding a proposi-
tion (h): the search can either respond in the affirmative (e), the negative (¬e),
or it can find nothing on the subject (n). Epistemic closure has been invoked
here to license inferences from search failure (i.e., a query resulting in nothing)
to non-existence, given that the database is assumed to be complete.
The Bayesian formalisation of epistemic closure is analogous; however, it
acknowledges that closure can be a matter of degree, ranging from complete
closure, through moderate closure, to no closure at all. Consequently it is
best conceptualised in probabilistic terms (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). For
example, one might be certain that one has lost a sock after looking through-
out the house, but also be fairly certain if one has only looked in several key
locations, such as the drawer and the washing machine.
The three-valued approach to evidence, which allows one to capture
degree of closure by varying the probability of a “no response” (P(njh)),
helps capture two kinds of arguments from ignorance:
(a) not (Database says: not exists), therefore exists
i.e., There is no evidence for X’s non-existence, therefore X exists
e.g., Nobody has proven that ghosts do not exist, therefore ghosts exist.
(b) not (Database says: exists), therefore not exists
FAINT PRAISE 417
i.e., There is no evidence for X’s existence, therefore X does not exist
e.g., Nobody has proven that ghosts do exist, therefore ghosts do not exist.
The relative strengths of these two inferences depend on the exact values
of the key probabilistic quantities involved. Typically, an inference of type
(b) will be stronger than one of type (a), and both will be less compelling
than corresponding inferences from positive evidence with the same charac-
teristics (for specific examples, see Corner & Hahn, 2009; Hahn & Oaksford,
2007, 2008). However, both (a) and (b) can be acceptable.
We propose that the Faint Praise effect stems from an inference of type
(b) above. To return to our example, the referee does not say that James is
good at maths, so the inference that is subsequently made is that he is not
good at maths. The reader’s degree of belief in the falsity of a given hypothe-
sis having not received a specific item of evidence is given by Bayes’ theorem:
Pð:hjnÞ ¼ Pð:hÞPðnj:hÞ
Pð:hÞPðnj:hÞ þ PðhÞPðnjhÞ ðEq:2Þ
where P(nj¬h) ¼ 1 – [P(ej¬h) þ P(¬e j¬h)] and P(n) ¼ 1 – [P(e) þ P(¬e)]. The
Faint Praise effect should occur wherever the probability of a “nothing”
response is less if the hypothesis is true than if it is false, PðnjhÞ < Pðnj:hÞ,
and thus the likelihood ratio,
PðnjhÞ
Pðnj:hÞ, is less than 1. In this case the non-
occurrence itself is informative because it suggests that the hypothesis is
false. Hence the effect should be observed where a motivated (or positively
inclined), but non-lying source is presenting an argument. By contrast, there
is no reason for this negative inference in the case of a maximally unin-
formed source,
PðnjhÞ
Pðnj:hÞ  1, who simply knows nothing on the topic, or given
a source who prefers, where possible, to explicitly provide negative informa-
tion, in which case it is likely that
PðnjhÞ
Pðnj:hÞ > 1. In reality, however, a motiva-
tion to be polite (e.g., Bonnefon, Feeney, & De Neys, 2011; Brown &
Levinson, 1987) will likely ensure that the latter situation is considerably
rarer than the Faint Praise effect.
The current account therefore incorporates Gricean pragmatics of con-
versation into a normative Bayesian framework. Gricean considerations
guide our assignments of conditional probabilities; that is, as listeners we
interpret speakers’ utterances in light of shared conversational norms that
guide our expectations about what kind of information the speaker should
deliver. At the same time, the formalisation brings out the relationship
between specifically Gricean examples, and the many other arguments from
ignorance found in day to day life—such as the, at surface level, quite differ-
ent examples above concerning ghosts, timetables, or socks.
Returning to our example of the reference letter, consider that instead of
being written by James’ mathematics teacher, it was written by James’ tutor
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who does not teach mathematics and who only rarely meets with James. In
this instance it could reasonably be assumed that his tutor would not possess
any specialist knowledge concerning James’ mathematical ability. With this
assumption, the reader of the reference letter could not make any inferences
pertaining to James’ mathematical ability on the basis of the letter. Conse-
quently, we would not predict the occurrence of a Faint Praise effect in this
instance as PðnjhÞ  Pðnj:hÞ and therefore PðnjhÞ
Pðnj:hÞ  1.
It should also be clear from the above, and the explanatory focus on
what is not being said, that information preceding the weak argument will
affect its influence. Returning again to our example, consider now the case
in which the referee has already stated that the candidate is an excellent
mathematician. Following this testimony, it is likely that the reader has
raised their opinion of James’ mathematical ability. If the referee now adds
that the candidate is polite and punctual (our previous weak argument),
what effect will it have upon the reader’s newly revised degree of belief? On
the view that a weak positive argument has a negative impact as a result of
not including important positive information (an implicit argument from
ignorance), a negative impact is no longer predicted (as the important posi-
tive information is included). A strong argument in favour of the candidate
has already been presented, and so this new evidence will have a persuasive
impact based solely on the importance that the reader places on punctuality.
Hence the reader’s opinion of the candidate will either remain unchanged or
increase, but it will not decrease.
We next test whether “faint praise” does possess these characteristics. If
the critical piece of evidence is intrinsically viewed as positive, it should exert
a positive effect where there is no “missing” evidence. In other words, a weak
argument preceded by relevant information (a strong argument) should
have a positive effect. In the absence of that information, however, an over-
all negative effect should be observed, and the strength of that negative
belief change should depend on the degree of closure associated with the
source. In other words, a weak positive argument alone will result in a
decreased degree of belief in the hypothesis under evaluation when coming
from an expert source (a Faint Praise effect), but no such effect will be
observed when the argument comes from a non-expert source (on source effects
more generally see e.g., Birnbaum &Mellers, 1983; Bovens & Hartmann, 2003;
Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2009; Schum, 1981).
METHOD
Participants
A total of 95, predominantly female, Cardiff University undergraduates
participated for course credit.
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Design, materials and procedure
We manipulated two variables: expertise (i.e., the presumed knowledge) of
the source, and the type of argument presented. There were three experimen-
tal conditions. Participants either read a strong followed by a weak argu-
ment from an expert source (n ¼ 32), only a weak argument from an expert
source (n ¼ 32), or only a weak argument from a non-expert source (n ¼
31). A full factorial design was not appropriate in this experiment, as the
non-expert source does not have the necessary information to provide a
strong argument.
Participants were presented with a mock UCAS application1 containing
background information (date of birth, address, GCSE grades)2 about a fic-
tional individual, James Driver. Based on this information participants were
required to indicate on a 21-point scale from 0 (never) to 100 (definitely)
whether they thought James should be offered a place to study mathematics
at Newcastle University. This rating constitutes a prior degree of belief in the
hypothesis that the applicant should be offered a place. Depending on the
experimental condition participants were assigned to, they were then pre-
sented with either one or two arguments from an expert or a non-expert
source. The expert source was an A-level mathematics teacher, who had
“taught James maths throughout his AS and A-level course”. The non-expert
source was the personal tutor of the applicant, who only met him “once a
term to discuss any concerns James has”. The weak argument stated:
James is a polite and punctual pupil.
The strong argument stated:
James has been a member of the top set for maths since the start of his sixth
form studies. As a mathematician he is sharp and clever with an ability to criti-
cally analyse others’ proofs and theories. When new material is introduced he
is quick on the uptake. On the odd occasion when he has failed to grasp a con-
cept straight away, he has demonstrated considerable maturity in his use of the
library’s resources to help him understand the topic in question.
Following each argument, participants were asked to provide updated
ratings of whether they thought James should be accepted onto the course.
At the end of the experiment we obtained participants’ estimates of the
relevant conditional probabilities involved in the Bayesian formalisation of
the argument (see Eq. 2) as a manipulation check. Since our formalisation
1UCAS (Universities and Colleges Application System) is the organisation through which
British school pupils apply to university.
2GCSEs (General Certificates of Secondary Education) are the first public examinations
taken by pupils in the UK.
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posits that the effect results from missing information, participants provided
six conditional probabilities: three conditional on the state of affairs that
James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician, and three conditional
on the state of affairs that James is NOT an intelligent and resourceful math-
ematician (see Appendix).
RESULTS
Figure 1 demonstrates the effect of all the information provided in the exper-
iment on participants’ ratings of James’ suitability for reading mathematics
at Newcastle University. From Figure 1 it can be seen that the strong argu-
ment was clearly effective in increasing participants’ ratings of James’ suit-
ability to be accepted onto the course.
The main goal of the experiment was to investigate the effect of weak
positive information when presented by either an expert (the maths teacher)
or non-expert (the tutor) either on its own, or preceded by a strong argu-
ment. In order to address this question we calculated change scores to illus-
trate the effect of the weak argument. These scores were calculated by
subtracting the admission belief ratings provided following the weak argu-
ment, from the admission belief ratings provided following the previously
presented information. From Figure 1 this is akin to taking the right-hand
column for each experimental condition and subtracting the value from the
column immediately to its left. A change score was thus computed for each
participant. The mean change scores are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Mean ratings of applicant’s suitability at every stage of the experiment in each of the
three experimental conditions. Error bars are plus and minus 1 standard error.
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A factorial ANOVA revealed significant effects of both the argument,
F(1, 92) ¼ 13.26, p < .001, MSE ¼ 62.33, and source, F(1, 92) ¼ 4.76,
p ¼ .032, MSE ¼ 62.33, variables on the effect of the weak argument. Our
predictions, however, were more specific than merely detailing differences
between experimental conditions. Specifically, we predicted that the weak
argument would exert a negative effect on admission belief ratings only
when it was presented on its own by an expert source. Individual single sam-
ple t-tests conducted on the belief change scores (Figure 2) show this to be
the case. A weak argument presented on its own by an expert had a signifi-
cant negative effect on participants’ judgements of James’ suitability, t(31) ¼
2.93, p ¼ .006. A weak argument presented following a strong argument, by
an expert, had a positive effect, t(31) ¼ 2.98, p ¼ .006, thus demonstrating
that the weak positive information was indeed weak positive information,
rather than neutral or irrelevant information. As predicted, the weak argu-
ment presented on its own by a non-expert did not affect participants’ judge-
ments of James’ suitability, t(30) ¼ 0.78, p ¼ .440.3
Having obtained subjective estimates of the relevant conditional proba-
bilities from participants, the Bayesian account is able to make quantitative
as well as qualitative predictions of the effect of different arguments. For
those participants receiving only the weak argument—those also receiving a
Figure 2. Mean effect of the weak argument on ratings of applicant’s suitability (change scores)
in each experimental condition. Error bars are plus and minus 1 standard error.
3 In each condition the modal belief change was zero, but the differences in the proportion of
participants changing negatively or positively across conditions was consistent with the experi-
mental predictions: Expert-weak (Negative: 38%; Positive: 16%); Expert-strongweak (Negative:
0%; Positive: 28%); Nonexpert-weak (Negative: 19%; Positive: 19%). Note, however, that the
most appropriate analysis at the individual participant level is the correlation analysis between
predicted final ratings and those participants provided.
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strong argument were not included as, for them, P(njh) and P(nj¬h) are not
relevant as the information is not missing—we observed a positive correla-
tion between their predicted final admission belief ratings (from Equation 2)
and those they provided directly, r(60) ¼ .43, p < .001, further illustrating
the power of a probabilistic account in accounting for different degrees of
belief change (see also, Harris, Hsu, & Madsen, 2012). Of the 58 (out of 62)
participants whose ratings of P(nj¬h) were greater than P(njh), 57 of them
did not revise their belief downwards as much as predicted by the Bayesian
model, consistent with conservative belief updating (e.g., Edwards, 1968;
Phillips & Edwards, 1966).4,5
DISCUSSION
At first glance, the Faint Praise effect seemingly presents a challenge to the
Bayesian theory of belief revision. How can positive evidence ever lead to
negative belief change? We proposed that the effect is an example of an
implicit argument from ignorance; the negative belief revision is driven by
inferences about the absence of positive information. A Bayesian formalisa-
tion incorporating the concept of epistemic closure enabled empirical predic-
tions to be made and tested.
The experimental data matched the Bayesian predictions. Specifically,
weak positive evidence from a knowledgeable (expert) source gave rise to a
Faint Praise effect in the absence of any strong positive evidence. A Faint
Praise effect was not observed when the weak evidence was preceded by
strong positive evidence. Indeed, the small but significant increase in belief
brought about by the weak argument in this condition illustrates the com-
plexity of the relationships here. It is not simply the case that the weak evi-
dence is completely irrelevant. It is considered positive evidence, but, in the
weak argument only condition, the effect of the (stronger) missing evidence
is overpowering. Finally, as predicted, there was no Faint Praise effect when
the evidence was presented by a non-expert source.
The Bayesian formalisation and the data presented here enhance under-
standing of the Faint Praise effect in several ways. They provide an empirical
test of Grice’s intuitions, while also extending Grice’s treatment. In particu-
lar, it is demonstrated how the relevant inferences are graded. The Faint
Praise phenomenon is not simply a consequence of a conversational
4One participant did not provide conditional probabilities and therefore could not be
included in this analysis.
5 The model predictions for the regression analyses are based only on participants’ priors
and estimates of the conditional probabilities concerning the silence about James being an
“intelligent and resourceful mathematician”. They omit the weak positive effect of the “punctual
and polite argument” in itself and are thus slightly conservative estimates of the correspondence
between model and data.
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implicature which is drawn or not (as it seems on Grice’s account), instead it
reflects a probabilistic judgement that is subject to degrees. Conceptually,
the gradedness arises because epistemic closure itself is a matter of degree;
empirically this is confirmed by the correlation between the likelihood ratio,
PðnjhÞ
Pðnj:hÞ, and the amount of belief change observed, r(60) ¼ .33, p < .01.
Furthermore, locating the Faint Praise phenomenon in the wider context
of arguments from ignorance, and Bayesian argumentation in general,
makes clear that there are virtually limitless possibilities for the subtle effects
that can arise here. Any factor that will influence the likelihood ratio will
influence the impact of a reference letter; for example, any evidence of bias
(e.g., dislike) on the part of the source (see e.g., Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983;
Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; McKenzie, Lee, & Chen, 2002; Schum, 1981).
More subtly, certain contextual changes will likely influence this likelihood
ratio. In the reference letter example the communication is relatively anony-
mous, confidential, and concerns a third person. In a face-to-face setting
where the subject (i.e., James) is also present, politeness concerns will usually
lead to an even greater reluctance to express negative information. Empirical
studies have shown that people are sensitive to pragmatic implications of
these politeness concerns and adjust their understanding accordingly (e.g.,
Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 2009; Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006;
Demeure, Bonnefon, & Raufaste, 2008, 2009; Juanchich, Sirota, & Butler,
2012; Sirota & Juanchich, 2012).
The Bayesian framework also allows clear predictions about the impact
of whatever positive information is provided in addition to that which is per-
ceived to be missing. Here, too, the Bayesian framework captures naturally
both message source and message content characteristics and their interac-
tion (for detailed treatment and experimental evidence, see Hahn et al.,
2009). This includes the extent to which multiple pieces of evidence “hang
together” or “cohere” (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Harris & Hahn, 2009).
In short, the Bayesian formalisation allows the many individual factors that
determine the impact of evidence to be incorporated within a single overall
framework that enables clear predictions, not just about these factors indi-
vidually, but also their interactions.
The results of our experiment also have implications for other models of
belief or attitude formation. In particular, our results cannot be accommo-
dated by traditional averaging models of belief adjustment (e.g., Hogarth &
Einhorn, 1992; Lopes, 1985), as these would predict the opposite effect to that
observed in the present study. An averaging model effectively evaluates the
polarity of a piece of information with respect to current belief. Thus such
models predict a stronger negative effect of positive evidence after the receipt
of a strong argument than without the prior receipt of a strong argument.
While such a result is often observed in traditional belief updating tasks
(see Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Lopes, 1985, and references therein), it is the
opposite of what is observed here. Lopes (1985) tentatively suggested that
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averaging might be less likely to occur in situations where stimuli were more
clearly “marked” in support of or against a given hypothesis. Subsequently,
Lopes (1987) succeeded in reducing participants’ use of an averaging rule by
instructing them to separate their judgements of belief updating into two steps,
where the first required labelling a piece of evidence as either favouring or
countering the hypothesis. We believe that our participants did not show the
use of sub-optimal averaging strategies because the domain used is familiar to
them and hence the evidence is subjectively well “marked” as to the hypothesis
it supports. The failure to observe the use of averaging strategies in this con-
text suggests that previous documentation of their sub-optimal usage may
result, at least partly, from the unfamiliar and artificial nature of traditional
belief updating tasks, such as the bookbag and poker chip paradigm (e.g.,
Phillips & Edwards, 1966; for another context in which participants seem to
prefer an optimal strategy over averaging see Harris & Hahn, 2009).
A similar result to ours was observed by Fernbach, Darlow, and Sloman
(2011), who found that the presence of a weak generative cause reduced par-
ticipants’ judgements of the likelihood of an outcome (effect). The explana-
tion offered for this paradoxical finding was that people focus on the single
focal cause provided when judging the conditional probability of the effect
given the cause, P(EjC). When judging the marginal probability, P(E), how-
ever, participants bring to mind a variety of possible causes, thus increasing
its subjective likelihood. This account relies on a causal relationship of E
causing C, which is absent in our Faint Praise scenario. Fernbach et al.’s
“Weak Evidence effect” and our “Faint Praise effect” are therefore qualita-
tively different phenomena.
There is, however, another model in the literature that might be applied
to our data. This model (McKenzie et al., 2002) was developed to explain
changes of opinion in the context of sequentially presented disputes. In four
experiments McKenzie et al. found evidence that was independently judged
to weakly support one side of the dispute actually decreased support for that
side when presented after a strong case for the opposition. This was
explained through the idea of a dynamic (and hence malleable) reference
point against which the strength of the evidence in favour of a position is
assessed, its so-called Minimum Acceptable Strength. Weak supporting evi-
dence can lower support for one side if the opposing side presents strong evi-
dence, because the strength of the latter influences where the reference point
is set: participants implicitly reason that “‘If that’s the best they can do, then
I believe the other side (even) more’” (McKenzie et al., 2002, p. 14).
The parallel to our own Faint Praise effect is clear, and on closer inspec-
tion, McKenzie et al.’s (2002) results seem well explained by the concept of
epistemic closure and the argument from ignorance employed here. The
strong case in their studies consisted of several individual pieces of evidence,
whereas the weak case consisted of only one. In particular, the weak case
did not seek to challenge or rebut all of the evidence provided by the
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opposition. This absence of a rebuttal is implicit negative evidence that sig-
nals tacit assent: if the defendant had evidence to counter the prosecution’s
evidential claims, then surely they would provide it. Moreover, the absence
of a rebuttal is more glaring, and hence informative, if the opposing evidence
has already been heard than when it has not (Experiment 3; for further refer-
ences demonstrating such order effects see Hahn & Oaksford, 2012). It is
also more informative when it comes from the defendant, a source that is
highly motivated and hence well-placed to provide all available evidence,
than when it comes from an independent third party (Experiment 4), in
direct analogy to our “expert” and “non-expert” source.
Hence we see no reason to invoke a special purpose “comparative stand-
ard”, for either McKenzie et al.’s (2002) data or ours. Rather, both fit well
within the probabilistic framework, which receives additional support through
the fact that the magnitude of the Faint Praise effect in our experiment is pre-
dicted by the relevant conditional probabilities participants provided.
In conclusion, “faint praise” invokes an argument from ignorance. This
argument form arises in everyday contexts as diverse as language learning
(Hahn & Oaksford, 2008; Hsu & Griffiths, 2009), informal reasoning
(Oaksford & Hahn, 2004), science communication (Corner & Hahn, 2009),
and science education (Fishman, 2009). The Bayesian formalisation provides
a unified treatment of these and makes clear how and why this common form
of argument, which was until recently considered fallacious, is rationally justi-
fied. In so doing, it exemplifies how a Bayesian approach to informal reason-
ing and argument can give detailed explanation of where evidence and
arguments are weak and where they should be viewed as strong. In this con-
text the present study clearly indicates that the relationship between source
and message characteristics is complex, and the effect that an argument will
have cannot be predicted without information pertaining to that argument’s
source. Persuasion researchers have long been aware of the importance of
both message content and source characteristics in affecting attitude change
(e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). However, these have typically
been viewed as alternatives in producing changes in belief within process mod-
els of persuasion. The Bayesian framework complements these process models
through its ability to make detailed predictions about the complex, non-
additive way in which source characteristics and message content can interact.
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APPENDIX
Format of questions to elicit participants’ conditional
probability ratings
Participants gave six conditional probabilities: three conditional on the state
of affairs that James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician, and
three conditional on the state of affairs that James is NOT an intelligent and
resourceful mathematician. The format in which these questions were asked
is given below:
In your opinion, if James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician, what
is the chance that his maths teacher, who has taught James all his AS-level and
A-level maths, would state in his UCAS reference for James:
(a) that James is an intelligent and resourceful mathematician
(b) that James is not an intelligent and resourceful mathematician
(c) he would make no mention of this information
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Please report your answers as numbers between 0 (absolutely no chance)
and 100 (would be certain to report this information)
(a) __________
(b) __________
(c) __________
Participants in all experimental groups completed these questions, but
for those in the non-expert group the words “maths teacher, who has taught
James all his AS-level and A-level maths” were replaced by: “tutor, who
meets with James once a term to discuss any concerns he might have”.
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